When buying a television, an ornament or a brand-new iPhone we often see the same label on the tag: “Made in China”. It has become a fixture on many consumer products sold in Western countries. In fact, over the last two decades, China has significantly increased its presence in foreign markets: export of goods and services surged from 0.61T to 3.75T USD (current US$)1 between 2004-2024. A large share of these exports is directed to other Asian countries, while the main ex-Asia trading partners are the United States (~14,8%) and the European Union (~15,8%)2. 

This expansion is not a coincidence. China has pursued an export-oriented industrialization strategy ever since, in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping decided to open the country to foreign companies and investors, and subsequent Five-Year Plans have repeatedly stressed the importance of exports. This way, Beijing secured larger selling volumes in developed countries and made effective use of economies of scale. 

So far, this strategy has paid off phenomenally: Chinese Gross Domestic Product grew on average by over 8% per year between 2000 and 2024, making the country the world’s second-largest economy. Yet the other side of the coin is that Chinese citizens do not fully benefit from those goods and services as consumers. Although living standards have generally improved, Chinese people tend to save much more money than Western peers, hence spending less. Gross savings in China averaged 42% of GDP in 2023, compared to ~25% in EU5 and ~18% US3. High savings levels come with upsides, especially supporting strategic investments, but they also highlight a structural weakness: when households refrain from spending, domestic demand remains fragile, limiting the country’s ability to rely on its own to secure stable growth in the future. That said, a critical question arises: is this model sustainable in such an unstable geopolitical landscape? 

The answer is controversial. Recent tariffs imposed and adjusted (multiple times) by US presidency threatened Chinese export in America; but Beijing seemed to be ready to face the American competitor, as concerns about Chinese expansions have been expressed multiple times in recent year. Similarly, the European Union launched an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese EV vehicles and in October 2024 imposed definitive tariffs to protect EU car manufacturers. 

Given that roughly one third of China’s current exports are directed to Western countries, concerns about the sustainability of the export-led model are increasing. 

“Household consumption will be key to sustaining growth amid external and domestic economic challenges,” said Mara Warwick, World Bank Division Director for China, Mongolia, and Korea. “Beyond short-term stimulus, stronger social safety nets, especially for migrant 

and temporary workers, would encourage more spending by improving financial security and reducing the need for precautionary saving.”4 

Supporting an increase in consumption is no easy task, however. In the short-term, China could leverage some redistribution mechanism, especially for low and middle-income households that are more sensitive to “precautionary saving”. The country still displays substantial heterogeneity in spending power across its population. In the long term, Beijing can rebalance budget outlays from local infrastructure toward people spending. This would involve greater investment in basic pensions, unemployment insurance and healthcare reimbursements. 

Additional resources could also be dedicated to supporting a recovery in the real estate sector, which is experiencing severe stagnation. In fact, in the past few years both consumer confidence and real estate sector development have declined across the country5. 

In May 2020, the Chinese Communist Party presented a new economic strategy, known as “domestic-international dual circulation”, aimed at making the economy more self-reliant in key sectors and reducing dependence on foreign markets. The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) stressed the necessity to sustain a stronger domestic demand system and, in 2022, the Central Committee and the State Council presented a document (“Outline of the Plan for the Strategy to Expand Domestic Demand 2022-2035”), in which the they explicitly call for ‘expanding residents’ consumption’, strengthening the welfare system and using the domestic market as a key pillar of long-term growth; the latter document, however, does not set any metrics to measure how well the strategy is being implemented6. 

China’s shift from “Made in China” to “Sold in China” therefore hinges on whether it can turn its vast domestic market into a more reliable growth engine. External demand is becoming less predictable, as tariff measures by the US and EU expose the vulnerability of an export-dependent model, while high household savings and a weakening property sector weigh on internal demand. In this context, the Chinese government has recently started initiatives to expand domestic demand in line with the “dual circulation” strategy. The impact of these policy measures is not yet clear. Consumption as a share of GDP has recovered to its pre-Covid level, but it has not materially increased7. It is therefore still too early to draw firm conclusions about the effectiveness of the Chinese government’s response. 

The coming years will show whether China can adapt its growth model to an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment and replicate the extraordinary growth it has recorded in recent decades. 

Sources: 

1. World Bank Open Data – Exports of goods and services (current US$) – China 
2. National Bureau of Statistics of China 
3. World Bank Open Data – Gross savings (% of GDP) 2023, EU5 are: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands 
4. World Bank Group – Unlocking Consumption to Sustain Growth in China – World Bank Economic Update 
5. National Bureau of Statistics of China and ECB staff calculations (2024) – Consumer confidence and real estate sector developments 
6. CSET | Center for Security and Emerging Technology (2023) Georgetown University – Outline of the Plan for the Strategy to Expand Domestic Demand (2022-2035) 
7. World Bank Open Data – Final consumption expenditure (% of GDP – China) 

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Our grandparents used to buy fabrics from the haberdashery and then sew their own
clothes. Our parents used to buy clothes they liked from physical shops. Finally, we are used
to opening our favourite browser, searching for the brands we prefer, and buying from their
online stores. What about the future? How are our children and grandchildren going to buy?
Well, China might have an answer to this.
Ten years ago, Alibaba introduced a mix of e-commerce and live streaming named live
commerce. It involves real-time demonstrations and product showcases by hosts or
influencers, allowing viewers to ask questions and make purchases directly through the
platform. It’s a model where entertainment, interaction, and instant purchasing converge into
a single, seamless experience.

Fashion Brand Strategy
As live commerce gained momentum, fashion brands in China quickly moved to align with
the new emerging possibility to increase sales among the younger audience. What initially
started as isolated campaigns — such as Dior’s early social commerce initiatives — has
evolved into a structured strategy where livestreaming plays a central role in both marketing
and sales. Today, live sessions are not occasional activations but recurring touchpoints
embedded in brands’ commercial calendars.
On platforms like Taobao and Douyin, fashion brands now operate their own dedicated
livestream channels, often hosted by professional presenters or in-house teams rather than
external influencers alone. This shift reflects a growing need for greater control over brand
image, pricing, and customer interaction. For example, international brands such as Nike
and Adidas have strengthened their presence through continuous livestream programming,
using real-time drops, styling demonstrations, and limited-time offers to drive engagement
and conversion.
Luxury players have also adapted to this model, albeit in a more curated way. Brands like
Burberry and Louis Vuitton have experimented with livestream formats that blend exclusivity
with accessibility — streaming runway shows, product launches, or behind-the-scenes
content while enabling direct purchasing. This approach allows them to maintain brand
positioning while still leveraging the immediacy and reach of live commerce.
In 2026, the strategy became increasingly data-driven and performance-oriented. Brands
use livestream analytics to optimize timing, content, and pricing in real time, while integrating
live commerce into a broader omnichannel system that connects online engagement with
offline retail. Physical stores, for instance, are often used as livestream studios, blurring the
line between digital and in-store experiences.
Live commerce has reshaped how fashion brands operate in China and reflects a broader
structural shift in retail. By collapsing the boundaries between content, community, and
transaction, China has created a model where shopping is a continuous, immersive
experience. As this system expands globally, it is likely that the future of fashion retail will not
be defined by stores or websites, but by screens, where consumers shop at the speed of
scroll.

Resources
Gucci: Pioneers in Virtual World Fashion:
https://ismguide.com/gucci-pioneers-in-virtual-world-fashion/
“It’s showtime! How live commerce is transforming the shopping experience” — McKinsey:
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/mckinsey%20digital/our
%20insights/its%20showtime%20how%20live%20commerce%20is%20transforming%20the
%20shopping%20experience/its-showtime-how-live-commerce-is-transforming-the-shopping
-experience.pdf
The Story Behind the Success of Livestream Platforms in China:
https://ecdb.com/blog/livestream-commerce-in-china-taobao-leads-but-its-dominance-fades/
4598?utm_source=chatgpt.com
China’s E-Commerce Platforms Explained (2025):
https://gl-open.com/blog/business/china-ecommerce-platforms-explained/
The fashion exec’s guide to Chinese social media platforms:
https://www.vogue.com/article/the-fashion-execs-guide-to-chinese-social-media-platforms
China turned livestreaming into a 24-hour sleepless hydra of a selling machine. Now the US
is catching up:
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-livestreaming-sleepless-selling-machine-us-catchingup-2025-10
China’s Livestreaming e-Commerce Industry Report:
https://www.chinaeu.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2021-China-Livestreaming-Ecommerce
-Industry-Report_Final.pdf

The post Fashion at the Speed of Scroll: Live Commerceand the New Chinese Retail Model first appeared on Bocconi Chinese Student Association.

There is a region in South America where Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile meet at an extreme altitude that may turn out to be one of the most strategically important pieces of land on earth. It is commonly known as the Lithium Triangle. Roughly 50% of the world’s identified lithium reserves can be found there, and because the global economy pivots toward electric vehicles and grid-scale energy storage, whoever controls this resource dictates the economic development of numerous countries.

China figured this out early. While Western governments were still debating climate policy frameworks, Chinese companies were signing offtake agreements, acquiring minority stakes in mining operations in the region, and building the processing infrastructure needed to turn raw lithium into battery cells. Slowly, but surely, developing a vertical supply chain. More than a decade later, those actions resulted in a position of extraordinary structural advantage, not just in South America, but across the entire lithium supply chain.

This article is an attempt to explain how that happened, and what it means for all of us.

The Triangle Itself

Lithium is a soft, silvery-white alkali metal that is used in the production of lithium-ion batteries. They power not only EVs but also are used in the grid storage sector, as well as portable electronics. The aforementioned use cases account for roughly 87% of the total demand. So, without lithium, the global energy transition would effectively stall. Moreover, no commercially viable alternative at scale only strengthens the leverage China and others can use. The lithium-ion battery market alone is valued at over $150 billion and is projected to exceed $400 billion by the early 2030s, driven almost entirely by electrification and grid storage buildout. So, how does the region of interest in South America actually look?

The lithium in this area sits in salt flats called salares, vast, blinding white expanses at altitudes above 3,500 meters, where ancient lakes evaporated. The leftover brine is saturated with a mix of lithium, potassium, and magnesium. And the approach of the three countries in question to the extraction of those deposits is strikingly different. Let us start with the most important one – Bolivia. It holds the largest reserves globally, somewhere around 23 million tonnes (circa 20% of global reserves), and has historically kept them under strict state control. The logic was sovereign and totally justifiable. Bolivia is a landlocked country with a colonial history. As a protectorateof Spain for nearly 300 years, it watched its natural resources being extracted by foreign powers with little to no local benefit. Lithium was supposed to be different. The resource Bolivia would develop on its own terms, capturing the value domestically rather than exporting raw ore. There is one catch, however. Building a lithium industry from scratch requires massive amounts of capital expenditure that Bolivia cannot afford, and with the infrastructure that it doesn’t have, production has remained minimal for years.

CATL, Contemporary Amperex Technology, comes into the picture. The Chinese firm, which is also the world’s largest battery manufacturer, eventually signed a $1.4 billion deal with Bolivia structured around this constraint. Rather than asking Bolivia to liberalize, CATL worked within the state-led framework. Under the agreement, the Bolivian state company YLB (Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos)retains a 51% stake in the projects, ensuring formal ownership remains with the state. Meanwhile, CATL provides the investment and advanced ‘Direct Lithium Extraction’ (DLE) technology. It’s a perfect model that threads the needle between sovereignty and investment, showcasing flexibility that has characterized Chinese engagement across the region.

Chile, on the other hand, has more commercially feasible geology than Bolivia. This makes them the second-largest producer of lithium worldwide and a country where mining accounts for about 11% to 12% of GDP. The previous government under Gabriel Boric created a crucial state-led plan in 2023 – the National Lithium Strategy. The set of measures mandated Codelco, a state-owned Chilean mining company and the world’s largest copper producer, to hold majority ownership (50% + 1 share) in important projects. Now, under the new President, José Antonio Kast, the political environment has changed by 180 degrees. His 2026 administration is now moving toward deregulation and private-led models to attract more Western and Chinese capital. Nevertheless, the state-led Codelco-SQM partnership, a cooperation established under the previous administration, remains a cornerstone. It is too big to abandon since the Chilean state will receive the majority of the operating margin through taxes, royalties, and Codelco’s dividends.  Still, operators like Rio Tinto are increasingly active as Chile balances state involvement with new market-friendly reforms.

The third and last player on the board is Argentina. Under President Milei, the country has gone the other direction entirely, opening aggressively to foreign investment through a new incentive regime called RIGI. Régimen de Incentivo para las Grandes Inversiones is a law that promotes large-scale, long-term investments exceeding $200 million by offering major corporate tax cuts from 35% to 25%, customs and foreign-exchange benefits, and 30-year benefits. The result has been something comparable to opening a dam. Firstly, Rio Tinto got a $2.5 billion company’s first commercial-scale lithium operation approved. Secondly, Chinese giant Zijin Mining committed $600 million to its Tres Quebradas (3Q) project, aiming to double its production capacity under the same tax protections. Last but not least, Chinese giant Ganfeng Lithium submitted a $3 billion proposal for its Pozuelos-Pastos Grandes (PPG) project to the RIGI, aiming for a massive 150,000-tonne annual capacity. Both Western and Chinese capital are competing in Argentina simultaneously, which arguably gives Buenos Aires more negotiating leverage than its neighbors.

The Processing Advantage

Contrary to popular beliefs, owning a lithium mine matters less than you might think. The real value and strategic leverage sit in what happens to the ore after it comes out of the ground.

Lithium extracted from brine or hard rock needs to be refined into lithium carbonate or lithium hydroxide before it’s useful for battery manufacturing. It is technically demanding, capital-intensive, and currently dominated by Chinese firms. The East Asian Power processes roughly 65% of global lithium, produces well over 80% of the world’s battery cells, and manufactures 56% of EVs. Even lithium mined in Chile or Argentina often travels to China for processing before re-entering global supply chains as a component in a finished battery.

This is not accidental. Over the past decade, Chinese companies, particularly Tianqi Lithium and Ganfeng Lithium, weren’t idle. They have systematically acquired stakes in upstream resources while simultaneously building out midstream processing capacity domestically. Between 2018 and 2024, Chinese companies invested over $16 billion in South American lithium projects alone. By 2023, Tianqi and Ganfeng collectively had access to nearly 40% of global lithium production through their South American operations. What everyone strives for? Vertical integration: control the mine, control the refinery, control the battery cell. This gives you the leverage at every stage of a supply chain that the entire energy transition relies on.

Because the metal under your feet is so important, it comes as no surprise that Bolivia has actually advocated for something that is comparable to how OPEC operates in oil – a lithium cartel among the three triangle countries. A proposal that is not irrational. Three neighbors controlling 60% of global reserves is a meaningful concentration; OPEC, for that matter, controls 80% of crude oil reserves. In practice, it’s unlikely to materialize, for several reasons. The three countries have fundamentally incompatible economic ideologies and with that three varying agendas. On one end, there is full state control, hybrid privatization being the middle, and on the other, there is Milei’s aggressive market opening, which adds even more friction when it comes to coordination. Lithium also lacks a standardized pricing mechanism, the way Crude and Brent oil have, which makes “cartel arithmetic” harder. Lastly, sodium-ion now acts as a price ceiling for lithium, offering a cheaper alternative for budget EVs and storage. Additionally, the 2022 price crash proved that if lithium costs spike, the market simply pivots to sodium or LFP, again undermining the leverage of a potential cartel. The price factor is also quite flexible as the market value of lithium dropped by about 90% from its all-time high in 2022. Furthermore, the rise of lithium recycling  “urban mines” in the West allows for local supply recovery that bypasses South American monopolies. This just demonstrates that no one has permanent leverage.

Chancay

The most visible single expression of Chinese engagement in South America isn’t a mining deal, it’s a port.

In November 2024, President Xi Jinping joined Peruvian President Boluarte via video link to personally inaugurate the Chancay Port alongside Peruvian President Boluarte. The facility, built and majority-owned by COSCO Shipping at a cost of $3.5 billion, is the first deepwater port on South America’s Pacific coast capable of handling the world’s largest container vessels. Before Chancay, no such port existed on this coastline. Thus, ultra-large ships had no viable stop between Panama and the southern tip of the continent, which meant cargo from Pacific South America typically had to be transshipped through North American ports before reaching Asia.

Some details: Chancay cuts the transit time from the Peruvian coast to Shanghai from 35 days to 23. That’s an astronomical 12-day reduction. This shift translates into cost savings across everything Peru and its neighbors export, including copper, lithium, soybeans, shrimp, and fruit. In its first year of full operation, the port is projected to handle between 1 and 1.5 million TEUs, rising to 2.5 million at capacity.

Not only is the port built by a Chinese firm, but it’s also equipped with Chinese technology. The complex runs on Huawei 5G infrastructure, uses BYD electric trucks for autonomous container transport, operates fully automated cranes produced by ZPMC (Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries), and tracks cargo via RFID throughout. It created long-term operational dependency that tends to deepen over time rather than diminish.

What makes Chancay genuinely significant beyond Peru is its connectivity. The port links via tunnel to the Pan-American Highway, meaning it functions as a gateway not just for Peru but for the entire western edge of South America. Bolivia, a landlocked country that will eventually need a Pacific export route for its lithium, has an obvious interest in using Chancay. Brazil has already expressed interest. It would help them in routing agricultural exports eastward by rail and then north through Peru. Ecuador too. They anticipate that cutting transit time will expand its perishable food exports to Asia significantly. And in April 2025, China launched a direct shipping lane from Guangzhou to Chancay, the first major direct route linking the two regions without North American stops.

What This Looks Like From the Chinese Side

It’s worth stepping back and understanding the internal logic of all of this and starting to connect the dots.

China’s 14th Five-Year Plan explicitly identifies lithium as a strategic resource. The country has committed to peaking carbon emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060, goals that require an enormous build-out of EVs and grid storage, which in turn require enormous quantities of lithium, cobalt, nickel, and copper. China doesn’t have enough of these materials domestically. It must import 70% of its lithium, 80% of its copper, and 95% of its cobalt. That is why their engagement in South America, at its core, is an industrial policy response to a genuine resource constraint.

Nevertheless, Chinese giants like CATL, BYD, and COSCO, apart from being backed by state policy, are real firms that answer to shareholders. Thus, their deals in Bolivia and Argentina make business sense in terms of an increase in revenue and general expansion. While many can say that these moves deepen China’s influence, they are, first and foremost, sound commercial investments that stand on their own merit.

The competition

But China isn’t the only one trying to gain a foothold in the region. They have to keep an eye on the EU and the USA, though neither really poses a threat right now. The former signed its long-negotiated trade deal with Mercosur in January 2026, after 25 years of stop-start negotiations. The EU is already Mercosur’s largest source of FDI at around $400 billion, so this agreement will only strengthen those ties by creating a free trade zone covering more than 700 million people. The latter has its own levers, including the Inflation Reduction Act’s critical minerals provisions, which create financial incentives for supply chains that don’t run through Chinese processing. But that’s the extent of it. Despite these frameworks, they have yet to exert any meaningful pressure on China’s regional lead.

The competition for South American resources is real, and it will intensify as the green transition accelerates. China has a significant head start, achieved by companies that moved early, adapted to local conditions, and built physical infrastructure that now shapes how the region connects to global markets. The focal point of this piece is still negotiating its future. Bolivia has yet to build a functioning lithium industry, Chile is shifting from state-led to private models, and Argentina has swung toward openness but could always swing back. None of these relationships is locked in permanently, but lithium, the quiet silvery metal sitting under those South American salt flats, is going to be contested for a long time.

Bibliography

Nem Singh, Jewellord. “How Latin America Can Harness the White Gold Rush.” Chatham House, March 2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2024-02/how-latin-america-can-harness-white-gold-rush

Chekerdjievа, Christina. “Resource Nationalism in the Lithium Triangle: Analyzing the Investment Environment for China’s Projects in the Lithium Industry.” International Relations Review, May 2025. https://www.irreview.org/articles/2025/5/15/resource-nationalism-in-the-lithium-triangle-analyzing-the-investment-environment-for-chinas-projects-in-the-lithium-industry

Undisciplined Environments. “China’s Expanding Footprint in South America’s Lithium Triangle.” March 2025. https://undisciplinedenvironments.org/2025/03/11/chinas-expanding-footprint-in-south-americas-lithium-triangle/

AidData. “Chancay Port Opens as China’s Gateway to South America.” November 2024. https://www.aiddata.org/blog/chancay-port-opens-as-chinas-gateway-to-south-america

Center for Strategic and International Studies. “South America’s Lithium Triangle: Opportunities for the Biden Administration.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-americas-lithium-triangle-opportunities-biden-administration

Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The Geopolitics of Port Security in the Americas.” 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-port-security-americas

Washington Post. “China Opens Huge Port in Peru to Extend Its Reach in Latin America.” November 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/14/china-peru-port-latin-america/

Asia Times. “China’s New Gateway into South America: The Port of Chancay.” November 2025. https://asiatimes.com/2025/11/chinas-new-gateway-into-south-america-the-port-of-chancay/

Wikipedia. “Port of Chancay.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Chancay

U.S. Geological Survey. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025: Lithium. January 2025. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2025/mcs2025-lithium.pdf

Mining.com. “Chile Mining Sector Faces Policy Test Under Kast Government.” March 11, 2026. https://www.mining.com/chile-mining-faces-policy-test-under-kast-government/

Shale24. “RIGI Map: Approved Projects and Those Still Pending for 2026.” January 4, 2026. https://www.shale24.com/en/oil-gas/rigi-map-approved-projects-and-those-still-pending-for-2026-n285

National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), People’s Republic of China. The Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2021–2025) and Long-Range Objectives through the Year 2035. March 2022. https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policies/202203/P020220315511326748336.pdf

The post White Gold: How China Is Quietly Winning the Lithium Race first appeared on Bocconi Chinese Student Association.

The South China Sea remains one of the most sensitive maritime regions in the world because several issues overlap there at the same time. It is not only a matter of territorial claims. It also involves maritime law, trade routes, fishing access, energy security, and the wider military balance in Asia. Several governments claim parts of the sea, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and none of those disagreements has been fully resolved. As a result, even when no major confrontation is taking place, the underlying dispute remains active. The region also matters because it is a major shipping corridor linking East Asia to global markets. CSIS China Power estimated that about $3.4 trillion in trade passed through the South China Sea in 2016, while a large share of China’s own maritime trade depended on those waters. That economic reality helps explain why Beijing views stability in the area not only as a matter of sovereignty, but also as an issue tied to commerce, energy, and national development, and why it regards any threat to freedom of navigation in these waters as a direct challenge to its own security and growth.

A major point of legal contention concerns the 2016 arbitral proceedings initiated by the Philippines. China’s Ministry of National Defence has called the so-called South China Sea Arbitral Award “entirely illegal, null and void,” stating that China does not accept or recognize it and will never accept any claim or action based on it. From Beijing’s perspective, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction and the proceedings were politically motivated. This position is not simply diplomatic posturing. It reflects a long-standing Chinese view that sovereignty over Nanhai

Zhudao, what others call the Spratly and Paracel Islands, is historically grounded and cannot be adjudicated away by an external body that China never agreed to submit to. For Manila and many Western observers, the ruling may serve as a legal reference point but framing it as a settled legal fact ignores a fundamental question: whether a ruling one party considers illegitimate from the outset can meaningfully resolve a sovereignty dispute. That gap in legal interpretation is central to why the dispute persists.

Recent developments suggest that tensions continue in part because both sides interpret the same incidents through very different frameworks. China’s Ministry of National Defence has accused certain forces within the Philippine side of going to great lengths to stir up troubles at sea and fabricate allegedly false narratives, thereby disrupting bilateral relations and undermining regional peace and stability. Chinese analysts have gone further, arguing that this reflects a deliberate strategy rather than a reaction to genuine grievances. According to Ding Duo, director of the Research Centre for International and Regional Studies at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, the Philippines is simultaneously pursuing two agendas: sustaining provocations at sea and stirring up public sentiment at home, with each agenda reinforcing the other. From this perspective, Manila’s actions at sea can also be seen as serving a political purpose by helping sustain domestic support and maintain a firm stance in the dispute.

That domestic political dimension is important to understand. A Chinese expert noted that shifting blame onto China over the South China Sea issue has become a form of political correctness for the incumbent Philippine administration, making it difficult for more pragmatic voices to be heard. This analysis challenges the assumption, common in Western coverage, that Philippine public opinion simply reflects genuine fear of Chinese aggression. When Global Times reporters visited Masinloc, the Philippine town closest to China’s Huangyan Dao, in 2024, local fishermen showed no signs of fear, distrust, or hostility toward China, with many emphasizing that “we are not enemies.” That human reality sits awkwardly alongside the narrative of popular anti-Chinese sentiment promoted by Manila’s government and amplified by Western media. A fair reading of the dispute must account for the gap between government rhetoric and the lived experience of ordinary people on both sides.

The growing military presence of outside powers in and around the South China Sea has added another layer of complexity. The Philippines has steadily expanded its network of defence partnerships to include the United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and most recently France. Supporters of these arrangements describe them as improving regional deterrence and preparedness. But from Beijing’s standpoint, the progressive militarization of the Philippines’ strategic posture, encouraged and enabled by Washington, represents a significant shift in the regional balance. China has stated it is unwavering in its will to defend territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests and has pledged more resolute countermeasures against what it describes as rights-violating acts, provocations, and propaganda from the Philippine side. The expansion of external military arrangements does not take place in a vacuum. It shapes how Chinese planners assess risk and respond, and it makes the path to de-escalation more difficult.

At the same time, it would be misleading to describe the South China Sea only through the lens of confrontation. Practical interests in trade, fishing, and energy remain central to all parties, including China, which depends on these sea lanes for a significant share of its maritime commerce. Local communities across multiple coastal states rely on access to fishing grounds that are now frequently contested. These material stakes are one reason why Beijing continues to invest in direct diplomatic engagement rather than relying solely on pressure. Reuters reported on March 28, 2026, that China and the Philippines resumed high-level talks on South China Sea tensions and energy security for the first time since January 2025, with discussions covering the safety of personnel and fishers and possible cooperation in oil and gas, agriculture, fertilizer, trade, and people-to-people exchanges. That willingness to keep channels open, even during periods of friction at sea, reflects a strategic preference for managed competition over open conflict.

This combination of firm posture and continued dialogue helps explain Beijing’s overall approach. China does not regard its position in the South China Sea as negotiable at the level of fundamental sovereignty, but it also does not seek unnecessary escalation. What it seeks is recognition of its historical claims, an end to what it considers provocation, and a reduction in the external military pressure it perceives as surrounding it. Those goals are unlikely to be achieved quickly, and the other claimant states have their own legitimate interests and concerns. Any fair account of the dispute should give due weight to Beijing’s position, rather than dismissing it as mere obstruction.

Overall, tensions in the South China Sea persist because the parties hold genuinely incompatible views on sovereignty, legal authority, and the role of outside powers, and none of those disagreements has found a resolution that all sides accept. China regards its position as historically grounded and legally coherent, and views continued pressure from Manila and its partners as a form of provocation rather than legitimate assertion of rights. The Philippines and its allies frame the same dynamic in terms of international law and freedom of navigation. A careful reading of recent developments suggests that neither side is about to change its fundamental position. The most realistic near-term goal is therefore not resolution but stable management: sustained dialogue, clearer communication at sea, and enough mutual restraint to prevent local incidents from becoming a broader regional confrontation that no party genuinely wants.

Sources

• Reuters. “Manila, Beijing Resume Talks on South China Sea, Energy Security.” March 28, 2026. 
• China Daily / Xinhua. “China Pledges More Resolute Countermeasures Against Provocations from Philippines.” March 26, 2026. 
• Global Times (via GlobalSecurity.org). “Expert Slams Manila’s Tactic of Hyping Public Sentiment and Sea Provocation Simultaneously.” August 27, 2025. 
• CSIS China Power. “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?”

The post Tensions in the South China Sea first appeared on Bocconi Chinese Student Association.

At the heart of central China, Wuhan stands where the Yangtze and Han Rivers join. The hustle and bustle of the city provides both ancient and forward-looking feelings. As the capital of Hubei Province, Wuhan bridges north and south, old and new, water and steel. Its rhythm is steady, shaped by students, merchants, and the constant movement along the riverbanks.

Wuhan’s story begins with its geography. It is divided into three historic towns : Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang. The city’s identity still reflects that trio. The Yangtze River cuts through it, crossed by the famous Wuhan Yangtze River Bridge, China’s first major bridge over the river. Along the water, life unfolds in full view: ferries crossing, joggers tracing the levee, and street musicians performing under the shade of plane trees.

One of the main symbols of the city is The Yellow Crane Tower. It rises above the Yangtze with sweeping views. Its golden tiles and layered eaves recall legends of immortals and travelers who once paused here to look out at the endless river. In contrast, the Hubei Provincial Museum showcases exquisite bronze bells from the ancient Zenghouyi Tomb,  a reminder that Wuhan’s roots reach deep into early Chinese civilization.

When the day warms, East Lake, one of China’s largest urban lakes, offers calm. Here, cyclists can weave along the waterfront, while rowboats drift past willow trees that hang over the water. Not far away, the Optics Valley area represents Wuhan’s modern drive,  full of technology firms, glassy malls, and university campuses buzzing with innovation.

Hearty and immediate food makes Wuhan even more attractive. Re gan mian are a morning ritual:  they are hot dry noodles made of sesame paste, chili oil, and pickled vegetables stirred together before work. Furthermore, the city’s night markets come alive with skewers, grilled fish, and bowls of duck necks spiced to a fine balance of fire and fragrance. Every district has its own rhythm of flavor, from riverside seafood to rich stews simmered in clay pots.

The city wakes early, thrives on conversation, and values both study and leisure. With dozens of universities, youthful energy flows through cafés, bookstores, and parks. Locals stroll the river promenade at sunset, playing cards or dancing to portable speakers.

Moreover, Wuhan is one of China’s largest inland cities, home to over 11 million people. It’s a major transport hub — the crossroads of China’s rail network and a growing center for advanced manufacturing and education. Summers are famously hot, earning it a place among China’s “Three Furnaces,” but the humidity comes with the reward of lush greenery and long evenings beside the river.

What stays with you after leaving Wuhan is its sense of balance — water and bridges, tradition and invention, the slow pace of a lakeside walk and the pulse of a city looking forward. At the confluence of two great rivers, Wuhan feels like the country itself, flowing toward the future while always remembering where it began.

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Introduction

In the context of globalization, cultural competence has become a fundamental component of effective international business practice. Understanding how social norms and symbolic behaviors shape professional interactions is particularly relevant when engaging with cultures where relationships play a central role. In China, two key concepts that illustrate this dynamic are hongbao (red envelopes) and guanxi (关系), often translated as networks of relationships.

This article provides an overview of these concepts and examines their relevance in both social and business contexts.

Hongbao: Meaning and Cultural Significance

A hongbao is a traditional red envelope containing money, typically exchanged during significant life events such as Lunar New Year, weddings, and other celebrations. The color red is culturally associated with prosperity, luck, and protection against negative influences (China Highlights, 2023).

Importantly, the meaning of the hongbao extends beyond its monetary value. It functions as a symbolic gesture that communicates respect, goodwill, and social recognition. As such, it reflects broader cultural values related to harmony, reciprocity, and interpersonal sensitivity.

Occasions of Use: Social and Professional Contexts

Hongbao are widely used in personal and social settings, including:

• Lunar New Year celebrations
• Weddings and family ceremonies
• Births and personal milestones

In addition, their use can extend into professional environments. In some corporate contexts, hongbao are distributed during festive periods (e.g., Chinese New Year) or significant organizational moments, such as company openings or achievements. These gestures are generally intended to express appreciation, reinforce morale, and maintain positive relationships (Yang, 1994).

While such practices may appear unusual from an external perspective, they are often embedded in culturally specific norms governing social exchange.

Symbolism over Monetary Value

A key feature of hongbao is the predominance of symbolic meaning over financial value. The act of giving is often more significant than the amount itself.

Elements such as timing, context, and numerical symbolism (e.g., preference for auspicious numbers like 8) contribute to the interpretation of the gesture (Hwang, 1987). This reflects a broader emphasis on relational balance and the maintenance of social harmony.

Guanxi: The Relational Framework

To understand the role of hongbao in business settings, it is essential to consider guanxi. Guanxi refers to a system of social networks and influential relationships that facilitate cooperation and mutual benefit.

According to Gold, Guthrie, and Wank (2002), guanxi is based on long-term reciprocity, trust, and the ongoing exchange of favors. Within this framework, social and professional interactions are interconnected, and relationship-building is often a prerequisite for successful business engagement.

Practices such as gift-giving—including hongbao—can therefore be interpreted as part of a broader relational strategy rather than isolated economic transactions.

Cross-Cultural Interpretations

From a cross-cultural perspective, practices like hongbao may be interpreted differently depending on local norms and regulatory frameworks. In some Western contexts, gift-giving in professional environments may raise ethical concerns, particularly in relation to transparency and anti-corruption standards.

However, these interpretations are shaped by distinct cultural and institutional frameworks. As Hofstede (2001) suggests, differences in values—such as individualism versus collectivism—can significantly influence how business practices are perceived and evaluated.

The Importance of Cultural Awareness

Cultural awareness is essential for navigating international business environments effectively. Misunderstanding culturally embedded practices such as hongbao may lead to miscommunication, reduced trust, or ineffective collaboration.

Conversely, developing an informed understanding of local norms enables individuals and organizations to:

• build stronger professional relationships
• enhance communication across cultural boundaries
• reduce the risk of misinterpretation

Conclusion

Hongbao and guanxi represent key elements of Chinese social and business culture, reflecting a broader emphasis on relationships, symbolism, and reciprocity.

Rather than viewing these practices through a purely external lens, it is important to situate them within their cultural context. Doing so allows for a more nuanced understanding of how business interactions are structured and maintained in China.

click the link below to see full slides carousel:

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References

China Highlights (2023). Red Envelopes (Hongbao) in Chinese Culture.

Gold, T., Guthrie, D., & Wank, D. (2002). Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi. Cambridge University Press.

Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations. Sage Publications.

Hwang, K. (1987). Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game. American Journal of Sociology, 92(4), 944–974.

Yang, M. M. H. (1994). Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China. Cornell University Press.

This article provides a simplified academic overview for educational purposes and does not represent all practices across China.

The post Understanding Hongbao and Guanxi in Chinese Business Culture🧧 first appeared on Bocconi Chinese Student Association.

Introduction 

In China, many of the Western apps we are used to like WhatsApp, Instagram, Google  Maps, YouTube, or Gmail do not work properly or are completely blocked because of the  country’s strict internet censorship system. To avoid getting cut off from maps, chats, or  payments, it is essential to download and set up the apps that actually work in  China before you travel and understand which local alternatives to use once there. 

Transportation 

Booking trains or flights and getting around Chinese cities can be challenging if you do not  speak much Chinese, since many local apps are only in Mandarin and the English interface  is often limited. A great option is Trip.com, which allows foreigners to purchase train and  flight tickets using their passport and a full English interface. Within cities, DiDi is China’s  equivalent of Uber and has an English version with features designed for foreign users. To  navigate, Baidu Maps, or Amap (Gaode) are far more reliable than Google Maps in China,  and downloading the offline map of your city before departure can save you in case of weak  or no internet connection. 

Internet Connection 

China’s internet is heavily regulated, and most Western services including Google,  YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook are blocked or extremely restricted. To keep access to  your chats, email, and social media, you need a reliable VPN (Virtual Private Network) that  works well in China. Trusted options include NordVPN, ExpressVPN, and Surfshark, all  proven to perform in the country. It is crucial to download and install your VPN before  entering China, test it in advance, and have it ready to activate upon arrival, since many  free or low-quality VPNs either do not work or are quickly blocked.

Payments 

In China, most payments, even in small shops or food stalls, are made digitally. The two key  apps are Alipay and WeChat Pay, both of which can be used by foreign tourists. With Alipay,  you can enable the “Tour Pass” feature to link international Visa or Mastercard cards and  make cashless payments easily. WeChat Pay is also useful, especially for longer stays or if  you want to use the app’s messaging and social features. Without these apps, you might  find many businesses refusing foreign cards, so it is advisable to set them up in advance.  Still, it is a good idea to carry some cash for small purchases, rural areas, or emergencies. 

Translation and Language 

In many daily situations, such as reading restaurant menus, finding your way around, or  communicating with drivers, a translator is essential. Download Google Translate and  make sure to download the Chinese language pack for offline use. The camera feature is  especially helpful for translating menus or signs. Alipay and WeChat also include built-in  translation tools in their chat and service sections, which can be useful when the interface  is partially in Chinese. You can also install Pleco, an excellent offline Chinese–English  dictionary, especially useful when traveling outside major tourist areas. 

Hotels and Accommodation 

When booking accommodation in China, you need to make sure the hotel accepts foreign  guests and is officially registered to do so. Use reliable platforms like Trip.com or Booking.com, which provide full English interfaces and accept  international payments. Always check that the hotel is listed as “foreign guest friendly,”  read recent English reviews, and confirm that the staff or customer service can  communicate in English or provide international support. 

Insurance and Health

While travel insurance is not mandatory, it is strongly recommended, since private  healthcare in China can be expensive and hospitals often require payment upfront. Apps  and services like Heymondo, AXA Travel Insurance, SafetyWing, or Allianz Travel offer  coverage for medical expenses, emergency evacuation, and lost luggage. Make sure your  insurance plan explicitly covers travel in China, provides 24-hour English assistance, and  includes digital claim management through a mobile app in case of emergencies abroad.

The post Useful Apps for Travelling in China  first appeared on Bocconi Chinese Student Association.

Article written by Alice Gong Jin Zi Lu

Suzhou (苏州 Sūzhōu) is located in the southeastern part of China, in the region known as Jiangnan, literally “south of the Yangtze River.” This area is famous for its mild climate, fertile land, and rich cultural traditions. With a history spanning over 2,500 years, Suzhou is widely recognized as one of the best-preserved ancient cities in China. Its old town layout, classical gardens, and historic streets remain largely intact, offering a rare glimpse into traditional Chinese urban life. 

Suzhou sits beside Lake Tai and is crossed by the ancient Grand Canal , which has shaped its development for centuries. Once known as Wu (吴 Wú) during the Spring and Autumn Period, Suzhou rose to prominence in the Sui and Tang dynasties and flourished in the Ming and Qing eras, when private gardens became cultural symbols for scholars seeking retreat and wealthy families pursuing refined living. Some people believe that the name “Suzhou” may have evolved from the ancient name “Gusu,” which referred to Mount Gusu (姑苏山 Gūsūshān) near the city. This poetic name was used in early historical records and reflects the city’s deep cultural roots. The official name “Suzhou” was adopted during the Sui Dynasty in 589 CE, possibly as a simplified form of “Gusu” for administrative purposes. 

The city is renowned for its classical arts, including Kunqu Opera, guqin music, Song brocade, Kesi silk, Suzhou embroidery, and the celebrated Biluochun tea. 

Biluochun tea, one of China’s most prized green teas, originates from Dongting Mountain near Lake Tai. Its name, meaning “Green Snail Spring,” comes from the tea’s tightly curled leaves resembling snail shells. The leaves are then withered, rolled, and dried with great care, preserving their floral aroma and sweet, slightly fruity taste. 

Suzhou embroidery (Su Xiu) is one of the Four Great Embroideries of China, with a history of over 2,000 years. It is celebrated for its ultra-fine silk threads, elegant color blending, and over 40 types of stitches. The most iconic technique is double-sided embroidery, where both sides of the fabric display equally vivid designs. Historically, Su embroidery was used in royal courts and among intellectuals, and today it is recognized as a National Intangible Cultural Heritage. 

Also its architecture reflects the craftsmanship of the Xiangshan Guild, known for elegant woodwork and traditional design. This architectural heritage is a key part of Suzhou’s enduring charm, which lies not in modern skyscrapers, but in its quiet streets, misty canals, and timeless beauty. 

Suzhou’s classical gardens are masterpieces of Chinese landscape design, each season revealing a different mood and meaning. Rooted in traditional aesthetics and philosophy, these gardens embody the principle of “borrowing scenery”, using surrounding elements like mountains, water, and architecture to create layered visual depth and emotional resonance. 

As the seasons unfold, each garden in Suzhou becomes a stage for nature’s quiet transformation, revealing how beauty evolves in silence and space.

Spring awakens the Humble Administrator’s Garden (拙政园 Zhuōzhèng Yuán) in a flourish of blossoms and flowing water. The garden’s open layout and winding paths mirror the vitality of the season, inviting reflection and renewal. In the heat of summer, serenity settles over Canglang Pavilion (沧浪亭 Cānglàng Tíng). Bamboo groves sway gently in the breeze, and moonlight dances on the pond’s surface. The garden’s poetic name evokes a timeless longing for simplicity and harmony. Autumn casts a golden light on the rugged rockeries of Lion Grove Garden (狮子林 Shīzǐ Lín). Its labyrinth of stone formations, carved to resemble crouching lions, offers not just visual drama but a contemplative journey through strength and solitude. In the stillness of winter, the bell of Hanshan Temple (寒山寺 Hánshān Sì) tolls across Jinji Lake (金鸡湖 Jīnjī Hú), echoing through the cold air like a memory. The temple, immortalized in Tang poetry, becomes a place of introspection, where silence deepens and time slows. 

Life in Suzhou feels like being gently carried forward by water. The pace here is never too fast, never too slow. 

In the morning, mist rises from the canals, drifting over the grey tiles and whitewashed walls. The air has a soft, slightly sweet humidity. The alleys aren’t fully awake yet—only the sound of a teahouse door opening, and a copper kettle being set on the stove, making a tiny ringing sound. A small boat sometimes passes under the bridge, the ripples spreading out in circles, like time echoing under the old stone arch. 

A day in Suzhou often begins with a bowl of noodles—the smell of broth and soy sauce filling the air. When you finish it and step outside, the sky is just starting to brighten, and the osmanthus trees (桂花树) by the street still hold drops of last night’s dew. 

By noon, the city becomes quieter. 

This is the perfect time for tea. In the old neighborhoods, teahouses sit half-open behind wooden doors, with the smell of Biluochun (碧螺春) drifting out. A few snacks are laid out on the table—red-date cake (红枣糕), slices of sweet lotus root (糖藕)—gentle and just sweet enough. 

Sunlight comes through the bamboo blinds, making the whole room feel soft. Someone is playing chess, someone is daydreaming by the window. Time seems to slow down a little more here. 

By evening, the stalls along Pingjiang Road (平江路) start to get lively. Oil bubbles in the woks, and the smell of fried stinky tofu (臭豆腐) mixes with the sweetness of roasted chestnuts (糖炒栗子). Tourists and locals walk side by side, stopping now and then to buy a jiuniang (cup of osmanthus rice wine with glutinous rice balls) (桂花酒酿圆子). When you scoop it up, you can still see the golden blossoms floating on top. Walk a bit further and the river reflects the lights. Boat shadows sway, and the sound of Suzhou Pingtan (苏州弹词 / 苏 州评弹) drifts through the narrow lanes. 

In Suzhou, eating isn’t just about filling your stomach—it calms you. Every dish is unhurried, just like the city itself. It looks quiet, but it’s always moving, slowly and gently.

The post Discover China EP. 7 – Suzhou first appeared on Bocconi Chinese Student Association.

Nanjing sits where leafy boulevards meet one of the Chinese mother rivers. It’s a city that pairs vast Ming-era walls and solemn memory with lakeside views as well as scholarly ambience, not to mention the delicious soups you can find in eastern China. So if you’re looking for a destination with historic, cultural, and culinary wonders, then Nanjing might be your place.

Set on the lower Yangtze(长江), Nanjing has been the capital for 6 dynasties and early Ming, as well as the Republic of China. The history of these lies in the manyfold historical elements  such as gate towers, mausoleums and museums ever present in the city. Nowadays, it’s a university hub, for this reason the streets look bookish, bike-friendly and the cafès full. Four seasons shape the city in gorgeous manners: plum blossoms in late winter, lotus on the lakes in summer, maple reds in autumn, so the city feels different with every visit.

In order to unveil the city’s history, we must begin with the Ming City walls and the Xuanwu Lake. A walk here offers an amazing skyline and water view, dropping down to the Lake’s islands for a breath amongst the blossoming lotus when it’s the season.

The Laomendong Historical District, literally “East of the Old Gate”, built during the Eastern Wu period (222–280 A.D.), has burst into a vivid commercial center, while preserving its wooden structure, providing a glaze into the deep history of Chinese southeastern villages and a wandering between the harmonic blending of tradition and modern really immerses the visitors into a different world.

Nearby, the Fuzi Miao, temple to Confucius resides on banks of the Qinhuai River, dates back to the 11th century. It does not only offer a view into the traditional architecture as well as Confucianism, but it’s more known for the district’s illuminated evening scene, creating a stunning modern lightshow merged into the history of the people.

Right in the same area, the Zhanyuan garden can be found. If you are more into the natural world in blend with the city, then this place offers the exact thing you are looking for.

If you are more of a museum kind of person, interested in the discovery of knowledge with guiding inscriptions, then the Nanjing Museum and the Memorial Hall of the Nanjing massacre are the places for you. The first is the oldest national museum built by the Chinese government, it offers artifacts from the Ming and Qing Dynasties as well as the renowned Han dynasty ox-shaped bronze lamp with a total of over 430,000 objects. It offers a vast array of galleries, ranging from art, history to digital and  Intangible Cultural Heritage. Truly a welcoming place for everyone. Furthermore, the access is free, though it requires online reservation. The latter is a solemn museum built to memorialize and document the victims and the atrocities during 1937-1938, when this very city was the capital. Thus, the place to come if you need to recenter your day.

Cradled by the Yangtze River, Nanjing is a city that feels alive in every sense —To truly know Nanjing, you have to taste it, walk through it, and feel its pulse from sunrise to sunset.

Nanjing’s story often begins at the dining table. Food here isn’t just sustenance — it’s heritage. Locals speak about their cuisine with pride, and it shows in every dish. The famous Nanjing salted duck is a perfect introduction: tender, fragrant, and delicately seasoned, a recipe perfected over centuries. Wander through the lively Confucius Temple market, and your senses come alive — the aroma of duck blood soup simmering in pots, the sweetness of sticky rice cakes, the sizzle of shengjianbao (pan-fried buns) crisping on the grill.

But Nanjing isn’t trapped in tradition. In neighborhoods like Xinjiekou and Laomendong, stylish cafés and experimental restaurants mix local flavors with modern flair. Whether it’s sipping a latte in a minimalist coffee shop or sharing fusion dim sum with friends, the city’s evolving food scene captures its spirit: grounded in history, yet always curious.

Every corner of Nanjing seems to tell a story. The mighty Ming City Wall still guards the heart of the city, offering sweeping views that stretch beyond time. The Nanjing Art Museum and the Presidential Palace reveal a city shaped by resilience, creativity, and transformation. Come evening, stroll along Fuzi Miao (Confucius Temple) and you’ll see the city at its most charming — lanterns reflected on the Qinhuai River, students laughing over street snacks, families gliding by in boats. It’s a scene that feels timeless yet alive, where everyday life and tradition flow together.

By day, Nanjing moves with purpose — students filling libraries, professionals crowding cafés, locals cycling through tree-lined streets. But when night falls, the city changes tempo. The 1912 district glows with music and conversation, its rooftop bars and jazz lounges buzzing with a cosmopolitan vibe. Street performers play beneath warm lights, and small eateries stay open into the early hours, serving comfort food to night owls and dreamers alike.

Nanjing is a city that invites you to slow down and take it all in. It doesn’t demand attention — it earns it, gently, through every flavor, every melody, and every moment that lingers long after you’ve left.

The post Discover China EP. 6 – Nanjing first appeared on Bocconi Chinese Student Association.

Let’s set a scene: beads of sweat trickle down the foreheads of the fighters from the three kingdoms. The reds, the blues and the yellows, face each other in the heat of battle. You wouldn’t be wrong into imagining a medieval battle set in the English Countryside, yet what this reflects is China’s on-demand economy. 

For a long time, it was a two-horse race between Meituan and Alibaba’s ELE.me, but this market was thrown into frenzy when JD.com entered. Their weapons of choice: cutting commissions, upgrading rider benefits and slashing prices down to zero. What followed looked and was argued by many regulators to be predatory pricing of unprecedented levels. These excessive price cuts and a dysfunctional market eventually led to necessary government intervention, in an attempt to stop the companies from spiralling into bankruptcy. In this article we will delve into how three tech giants had their profits run dry through headline-grabbing discounts designed to yank demand at any cost.

The first of the three combatants is Alibaba, often labelled China’s Amazon, one of the most well-known companies on the planet, let alone in China. It was started in 1999 in Hangzhou by the famous Chinese billionaire Jack Ma and his 17 colleagues. Its operations span marketplaces such as Taobao and Tmall, a logistics network through Cainiao, and a wide suite of cloud-computing services like Google’s Cloud. Alibaba’s acquisition of ELE.me for $9.5 billion in April 2018 reflected a bold move to take full ownership of the online food delivery company a major player in China’s delivery sector, easily identified by its fleet of blue-uniformed couriers. It was Alibaba’s effort to cement its power in China by expanding its “new retail” initiatives. These very initiatives underscored Alibaba’s push to blend online and offline commerce. In 2025, Alibaba tightened Ele.me’s integration with Taobao, its vast online marketplace, by launching an instant-commerce portal promising delivery in under an hour. Within weeks, it was fulfilling more than 40 million orders a day, doubling to 80 million at the height of promotional campaigns. Alibaba’s entry into a highly competitive food delivery market proved extremely successful, and by 2025 they controlled 33% of the market as the second most powerful company in what became a duopolistic market structure.

Next, we have Meituan, a company that was founded in 2010 as a Groupon-style deal site that evolved into China’s dominant local life super app. It eventually transitioned to the delivery market and quickly became the powerful market player with analysts estimating its current market control to be 65%. This in combination with ELE.me’s 33% control meant that the companies controlled of 98% of the market, a dangerous duopoly position for consumers. This situation inevitably contributed to a highly entrenched structure, causing incredibly high barriers to entry and making any new share grab incredibly expensive. In July 2025, Meituan reported a record 150 million daily orders across its food and instant retail categories. Furthermore, Meituan is known to have not always played a fair game and carries an antitrust fine from its “pick one of two” policy, which forced restaurants into exclusivity agreements by preventing them from listing on competing delivery apps, stifling competition across the sector. This policy led regulators to fine the company $534 million in 2021 and had a significant negative effect on the company’s reputation within China. Meituan’s drivers wear a distinctively yellow uniform, shown below.

The final contestant and the underdog of the 3 competitors is JD.com. It wasn’t the first time that JD had attempted to break into the delivery market, having previously tried to do so unsuccessfully in 2015 through a service called JD Daojia. It struggled which was historically a first-party e-commerce/logistics powerhouse. JD re-entered the takeaway market in February 2025, a dangerous attempt at trying to enter and usurp two tech giants. 

How JD.com lit the fuse

The moment that JD entered the market all hell broke loose, with its first move leading to a labour reset. It didn’t just dangle coupons in the eyes of potential customers; it reframed the labour market by promising to sign riders to full social insurance and a housing fund, raising the bar industry-wide. Meituan decided to respond immediately on the very same day by scrapping certain overtime and late delivery penalties. In addition, it committed to pay social insurance for its full-time and stable part-time riders from Q2 2025. This was all an effort to build harmonious labour relations by pretending that these decisions had been under development since 2022, when they had only been the created in response to the now threatening competition posed by JD. With this strategic move JD managed to squeeze itself in and scavenge a market share of 4-5%. What followed would be the norm as the companies competed; JD publicly accused rivals of pressuring riders who accepted its orders, while Meituan denied wrongdoing, and the “war of words” wiped billions from market caps.

Then, JD decided to drop a massive campaign which granted me discounts nationwide. Low prices ranging from 0.01 meals and 50% discounts reigned across the country as JD attempted to stimulate demand for its new platform and gain market share. The competitor soon follows it, and the competition is labelled as the fight of the three kingdoms, with steady orders hitting a record 150m daily amid the heated battle between JD.com and Alibaba. JD publicly denounced its competitors on social media, something which is regular occurrence in China but a foreign concept for most executives in the West. All of this occurred while ELE.me continued to retain its market position in the shadows, and once they saw the intense competition they were facing, they went to their own parent company, Alibaba, and duly received $7.3 billion in fresh funding.

The fierce price war only led to more discounts, which drained industry profits even more, and as mid-July came, Meituan released a fresh batch of new discounts. The media dubbed it a three-way fight as JD and Meituan publicly sparred, and Alibaba leaned in with its Taobao instant commerce and Super-Saturday Flash events. Merchants on TaoBao Flash saw big non-food category month-over-month surges during July promotions. Amid the order frenzy, Meituan hit a stunning 150m daily orders, while Alibaba’s instant commerce exceeded 40 million daily orders within weeks. Furthermore, JD had over 25m daily orders at its peak, driving a flood of rider tasks.

This order influx had a positive effect for many riders, with social media being flooded by screenshots of riders showing ¥1000-¥1700-day earnings during peak demand. But those wins weren’t representative of typical earnings and came with extreme routing pressure. There were plenty of examples where consumers ordered items that simply didn’t arrive and we’re being messaged by riders and at the same time you had people ordering different things to what was delivered. Furthermore, there was a massive financial impact on the 3 company’s stock margins profits in stock moves in 2025 being greatly affected by this price competition that eventually led to government intervention. With zero one or free promo proliferating the China’s State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) summoned Meituan, ELE.me and JD in mid-July, ordering them to comply with the e-commerce anti-unfair competition laws by making them promise to stop excessive subsidy escalation.

Looking at the financial impacts of this wild west affair, it is very clear that it had a long-lasting and profound effect on both performance and the financial health of the three companies involved. Meituan’s revenue increased by +12% YoY to 91.8b RMB but adjusted net profit was down 89% YoY as subsidies and incentives ballooned costs and bled their finances dry. JD similarly experienced increased revenue in Q2 2025 of 357B RMB, which was an increase of 22% YoY. However, its profit margins were greatly compressed, going from 4.3% a year earlier to 1.7%, an indication that the impacts of instant delivery investment would drag onwards. Alibaba was the least hit of the group and came through the quarter much steadier, with its revenue reaching 240B.

All in all, subsidies and discounts torched company profits, invited regulators back into the conversation and forced everyone to decide whether market share or margins matter more over the coming year. Even after the SAMR’s intervention, subsidies continue to reign on as instant retail in China continues to be an engine for growth. Alibaba has reported that its TaoBao instant commerce topped 40m daily orders within a month, so the high demand may be here to stay. As instant retail goes beyond food, analysts project the market will more than triple by 2030 to $352B as the delivery market develops beyond just meals; it can now be everything from groceries to pharmacy and small electronics.  There are a few competitors to watch that may try and usurp the incumbent firms:

1. The first of them is Pinduoduo (Duoduo Maica): an online Chinese retailer which pilots instant retail infrastructure that was founded in 2015 and is currently headquartered in Shanghai. With its slogan of “Together, More Savings, More Fun”, we can expect it to be right at home within a market characterised by large discounts. In the future expect aggressive grocery-led promotional campaigns where Pinduoduo is at its strongest.

2. Then we have SF Intra-City, a third-party courier that is currently the largest independent third-party on-demand delivery platform in China. Its instant delivery service currently covers a wide range of items, including food, fresh produce and flowers. Its growing revenue and merchant base gives merchants an alternative to platform fleets, and it currently poses a threat to the 3 tech giants controlling the game.

3. Lastly, we have the short-video platforms such as Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok) and Kuaishou. building off order-in-feed journeys, they have the potential to greatly disrupt the market with their unique selling point: you’re watching the food being reviewed, so why not just order it directly from the app? Today they hand off fulfilment of orders to Meituan and other third parties, but tomorrow they could leverage their credible demand funnels and enter as strong market participants.

Only time will tell whether these potential competitors may turn the war into one of more than 3 kingdoms, but the signs show us that the incumbent firms market control may not last for much longer.  

This has happened elsewhere: the EV price war playbook

China’s EV sector ran an extremely similar script where large price cuts and discounts eventually led to the collapse of profitability margins for big market players such as BYD, Nio and XPeng. In the middle of 2025, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other regulators ended up warning carmakers to stop with their ‘disorderly price cuts’, citing that there was overcapacity coupled with “involution” (intense and self-defeating price competition) that was negatively impacting competition within the sector. The Chinese government even launched quality/consistency inspections as exports ramped up as a relief valve, leading to US sanctions and tariffs on Chinese EVs as well as any countries that bought from them (such as Mexico). If discounts and price competition continue to occur in the delivery market, we can expect similar government and regulatory intervention with guidance against excess subsidies and more forceful nudges towards ‘healthy competition’.

As the Chinese government faces disinflation and deflation risk with its CPI currently sitting at 0.2% it is faced with a difficult quandary as its economy is also experiencing weak economic growth of 4.8% (below its goal of 5%) driven by a property crisis and weak domestic demand. Consumers are remaining cautious as the government uses targeted stimulus such as trimming their policy rate by 10 bps to 1.4% and government bonds with much longer-maturities of 20-50 years to fund public investment. These steps should support growth, but they do not reflect a giant stimulus package which would help unleash large amounts of consumer expenditure. What is clear however, is that they need to get price wars such as the ones raging on in the delivery market and across the economy under control or risk companies suffering. Furthermore, they must also incentivise individuals to spend now-not wait for potential discounts-through potential stimulus packages. Policymakers will need to restore household confidence and incomes before spending will re-accelerate, and the Chinese economy returns to the booming growth phase we once saw.

The post The Race to the Bottom: How Price Wars are Shaping China’s Economy first appeared on Bocconi Chinese Student Association.